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Until recently Azad Kashmir – the narrow slice of territory which is bounded by the rivers Jhelum and 
Neelum to the West, and the Indo-Pakistani cease-fir  line which winds through the high valleys of the 
Pir Panjal to the East – was largely a forgotten backwater. India has long dismissed Azad Kashmir, with 
its allegedly autonomous Government based in Muzaffarabad, as nothing more than a puppet of the 
Ministry of Kashmir Affairs in Islamabad; and although Pakistan has always vigorously denied such 
charges, there can be little doubt that Azad Kashmir has in fact always been kept on a very tight leash. 
 
That is not to say, however, that there has been anything very active about Pakistan's policy with respect 
to Azad Kashmir. To be sure a careful watch has been kept on Muzaffarabad – above all in order to 
ensure that over-enthusiastic local politicians did not take an embarrassingly activist position on the 
prospect of liberating the remainder of Kashmir; but almost all other issues have been put firmly on the 
back burner.  
 
So, for example, the level of expenditure o  rural development has – with the exception of the special, 
and, as we shall see, largely counter-productive case of the Mangla Hydel scheme – long been a good 
deal lower in Azad Kashmir than elsewhere in Pakistan; international aid agencies have been died 
access, on the grounds that Azad Kashmir is a "sensitive area"; most strikingly of all, these same 
grounds are used to justify the routine exclusion of information on Azad Kashmir from virtually all 
public statistics. Even census data remains unpublished. 
 
But if Azad Kashmir remained an overlooked backwater for many years, the current crisis beyond the 
Pir Panjal together with growing tensions across the cease-fire line, has changed all that. Suddenly that 
small slice of Kashmir which has claimed Azadi status for the past forty years has gained a position of 
much greater prominence: articles datelined Muzaffarabad now regularly appear in the Western – and 
indeed the Indian – Press.  
 
Even so, the journalists who make these reports are invariably primarily concerned with developments 
within the Kashmir Valley itself, with the scale of the refugee exodus, and with the arming – or non-
arming – of potential mujahideen. Few stop to consider what is going on amongst the Azad Kashmiris 
themselves, nor to explore what position they – and Pakistan – might adopt if India were ever to 
conclude that an ever more repressive occupation of the Kashmir valley was no longer worth the candle. 
If it did, by whatever means, break away from India, where would Azad Kashmir then stand? The 
answers are complex – and paradoxical.  
 
Who are the Azad Kashmiris? 
 
While the Kashmiris of the central valley have, and feel themselves to have, a wide range of cultural and 
linguistic commonalities, those living on the western slopes of the Pir Panjal are a good deal more 
diverse. Not only do they have little in common with the Kashmiris of the Srinagar valley – from whom 
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they are almost as sharply differentiated as are from the Dogras of Jammu – but they are also marked, as 
is only to be expected in such a mountainous region, by a great deal of local diversity.  
 
That said, some generalisations can still be made. Prior to 1947 this region was one of the most 
overwhelmingly Muslim parts of the Maharaja of Kashmir's territories: unlike Jammu where Hindus 
were and are in the majority, and the Valley with its substantial Brahmin minority, to the west of the Pir 
Panjal tiny Hindu and Sikh minority was confined to the region's few small market towns. None at all 
remain today, however, for they all fl d to India in 1947.  
 
Yet although Azad Kashmiris are overwhelmingly Muslim, their cultural connections with the Valley 
proper are few: instead they are best seen as forming the eastern and northern limits of the Potohari 
Punjabi culture which is otherwise characteristic of the upland parts of Rawalpindi and Jhelum Districts. 
Even so, this is only to identify their broad location on the cultural map of the region, within which 
further, more localised  cultural variations are still of great significance. So it is that the inhabitants of 
Azad Kashmir have as yet developed only a very limited sense of their own collective unity, despite 
having been incorporated into an administrative unit of their own for the best part of half a century. 
 
Caste and Biraderi Divisions  
 
As might be expected, caste and biraderi divisions are still of great importance, but what is also striking 
is that they have led to the adoption of some strikingly different perspectives on just what it means to be 
a Kashmiri. So, for example, while most people in the more northerly, Sudhan-dominated areas around 
Bagh and Rawalakot are just as enthusiastic about identifying themselves as Kashmiris as are those in 
the southern-most Jat-dominated District of Mirpur (which is also the area with which I myself am most 
familiar1) closer examination soon reveals that their commitment to Kashmir has arisen for quite 
different reasons, and consequently gives rise to a very different set of objectives.  
 
So, for example, while the Sudhans still remember with pride that it was they who were amongst the 
first to take up arms in rebellion against the Maharaja's forces2, iming, as they still do, to bring the 
whole of Kashmir into a wider Pakistan – their slogan is "Kashmir Pakistan banega", the perspective 
which most Mirpuris adopt these issues is very different. Paradoxically enough, the Mirpuris tend – ev n 
though they differ little in cultural terms from the Potohari population on the far side of the river Jhelum 
in Pakistan proper – to be enthusiastic supporters of a Kashmiri entity which would be entirely 
independent of both India and Pakistan – their slogan is "Kashmir Azad banega". Yet as we shall see in 
a moment, they have adopted this position not so much as a result of a clear and positive commitment to 
the cultural distinctiveness of the Kashmir region as a whole, but rather as a consequence of their strong 
sense of disillusionment about the way in which Pakistan has treated them. It is worth exploring in some 
detail just how this has come about. 
 
 
Azad Kashmir, Mirpur and Pakistan 
 
In administrative terms Azad Kashmir is only nominally autonomous: from the very outset all important 
decisions have always had to be cleared by – if they had not already been taken in – the Ministry of 
Kashmir Affairs in Islamabad. Yet although Pakistanis in both official and unofficial spheres have long 
tended to regard Azad Kashmir as having only the most peripheral significance in the national scheme of 
things, this region and its population has in fact made a considerable contribution to the economic well-
being of country as a whole.  
 
Firstly Azad Kashmir has contributed disproportionately to Pakistan's stock of overseas migrant 
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workers, and hence to the inflow of remittances in foreign exchange3. Such remittances, it is worth 
emphasising, have played an even more critical role in Pakistan's national finances than in India: in the 
early 80's, when such remittances reached their peak, they provided well over 50% of the country's 
foreign exchange earnings, and even today the figure has probably not dropped much below that figure.  
 
Overseas migration – which in Pakistan, as in India, has recently been overwhelmingly targeted on the 
Middle East –has not, however, been an exclusively Kashmiri phenomenon. But apart from urban 
outflows from Karachi and to a lesser extent from Lahore, the overwhelming majority of unskilled 
emigrants from Pakistan have been drawn from the ba ani (and hence less agriculturally prosperous) 
areas which sweep in a great arc from Peshawar through Azad Kashmir, Rawalpindi and Jhelum and 
down to Sialkot. But although emigrants from the more northerly districts of Azad Kashmir are 
particularly heavily represented in this outflow, they still only constitute a relatively small proportion of 
the total. Where Kashmiris occupy a very much more prominent position, however, is in emigration to 
Britain. Somewhere in the region of two thirds of all British Pakistanis are in fact of Azad Kashmiri 
origin. 
 
Nor has this outflow occurred from across the length and breadth of the region: instead the 
overwhelming majority of emigrants stem either Mirpur District, or from the southern part of Kotli 
District which lies immediately to the north of it. In this area the scale of emigration has been truly 
massive. In many villages well over half the population now lives overseas, with the result, thanks to the 
remittances they have sent back, that there has been an immense inflow of wealth into these otherwise 
remote and isolated settlements.  
 
This has had complex, not to sayparadoxical, consequences. So it is that although most villages In 
Mirpur District are now as capital rich – in the village which I myself examined, with resident population 
of no more than 3,000, the five local Banks had no less than Rs. 5 Crore on deposit  – th  new wealth 
has brought some very mixed blessings. In the short run living standards have most certainly risen, but it 
is equally clear that the inflow of resources has not stimulated real and sustainable economic growth. 
Most strikingly of all, while Mirpuris now control a plenitude of investment funds, finding  secure and 
profitable ways to deploy them, other than by leaving them on deposit in the bank has proved to be 
exceedingly problematic, given Mirpur's specific location in the wider political economy of Pakistan. 
 
Mangla and its Consequences  
 
One source of these difficulties is very concretely manifested in the shape of the Mangla Dam, which 
confines the waters of the rivers Jhelum and Poonch just before they break out into the plains of the 
Punjab proper. To Pakistan Mangla is a vital asset which brings many benefits: second only to the 
mighty Tarbela as a source of hydro-elect ic power, it also serves as the principal water-storage 
reservoir for the entire canal system West Punjab. Mangla is thus of critical to the success of the 
Pakistani economy as a whole.  
 
Yet despite the great benefits – in terms of cheap electricity, year-round irrigation and security from 
flooding – which Mangla has brought to everyone in Pakistan proper, those unfortunate nough to live 
immediately upstream of the dam have had – s in so many other similar projects elsewhere – to bea  the 
brunt of its environmental costs. It is the Mirpuris who have had to witness the disappearance of much 
of their most fertile agricultural land, as well as the District's two market towns, Mirpur and Chaomukh, 
beneath the waters of the lake; it is they, too, who have had to cope with the intensely disruptive impact 
of the rising waters on the local infrastructure, and particularly on transport and communications.  
 
Infrastructural damage is, of course, an inevitable consequence of all such projects. Yet although a 
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comprehensive effort to make good that damage would have added only a tiny fraction to the overall 
costs, both the Governmnt of Pakistan and the World Bank – which provided most of the finance for 
the Mangla scheme – chose to scrimp and save. This was only too obvious to the Mirpuris. Although 
the dam contractors built a first-class road around the southern (and originally vi tually unpopulated) 
shore of the newly formed lake, the long and winding road around the densely populated northern shore, 
and which now provided the remainder of the District with its only access to the Plains, was built to a 
much lower standard, and not fully  completed until some years after the water had risen; and it was 
more than a decade before a bridge was finally constructed across the river Poonch to Tehsil Dadial, 
which the rising waters of the dam had turned into an isolated peninsula inaccessible to vehicular traffic. 
As we shall see, much was to turn on this.  
 
The History and Consequences of Emigration  from Mirpur 
 
Such a failure to make good the damage caused by large- cale construction projects is, of course, all too 
common; and if such situations can be expected to produce an upsurge of hostility towards the 
beneficiaries of such projects, especially when they live elsewhere, then this tendency was yet further 
reinforced as a consequence of the very high level of overseas migration that has taken place from 
Mirpur in general and Tehsil Dadial in particular. The interaction the Mangla project and overseas 
migration has, however, been much more complex than is commonly appreciated. So, for example, 
although it is regularly assumed that the high level of emigration from the area is a direct result of 
Mirpuri peasants seeing their land disappear beneath the Mangla Lake, closer examination soon reveals 
that it is in fact the culmination of a process which had begun many years before the dam was even 
thought of.  
 
As long ago as the closing decades of the last century, Mirpuri villagers had begun to take jobs as 
stokers on British merchant ships operating out of Bombay. Just why they began to do so is most 
obscure, but the most likely explanation is that it was their way of coping with a major disadvantages of 
their status as Kashmiris: while the Potohar plateau was a major source of recruitment for the British 
Indian Army, it is clear that the British were most reluctant, except in times of war, o recruit subjects of 
the Maharaja of Kashmir as soldiers in its Punjabi regiments. So it was that while the sons of small 
peasant farmers in Rawalpindi and Jhelum Districts were able to supplement their meagre agricultural 
incomes by signing up as soldier , th ir counterparts across the river Jhelum were forced to look 
elsewhere. Just how they discovered that there was a demand for stokers in Bombay, and who the 
original pioneers were, I have not yet been able to establish. Once the initial connection was made, 
however, the rest was easy. The railway station in Gujjar Khan was little more than a days' walk away 
from most parts of Mirpur District, and having reached Bombay finding work presented few difficulties. 
By the end of the last century a high proportion of engineroom and stokehold sir angs were themselves 
from Mirpur. 
 
As Britain's coal-powered merchant fleet continued to expand rapidly during the early decades of this 
century, so the demand for labour steadily increased, and seamen began to be recruited from an ever 
larger numbers from an ever wider swathe of villages. As seamen, Mirpuris were in an excellent position 
from which to keep a close watch on global job opportunities, for the  more adventurous amongst them 
soon began to look for opportunities to work ashore. Getting such jobs was by no means easy, of 
course, for racial exclusionism was always an obstacle. Nevertheless when acute industrial labour 
shortages began to emerge in Britain during the course of the second-world war, Mirpuri ex-seamen 
(many of whom had had their ships torpedoed from beneath them) were eagerly recruited to fill the 
gaps.  
 
It was these war-time pioneers who formed the bridge-hea  for further settlement. When opportunities 
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began to widen still further in Britain's subsequent post-war boom, Mirpuri seamen began to leave their 
ships in ever-increasing numbers. And having established themselves ashore, they began to call their 
kinsmen over to join them, so unleashing a process of chain migration. As a result over half the 
population of many Mirpuri villages now lives abroad, while well over half of Britain's Pakistani 
population – which is now over third of a million strong – tems from this one small area.  
 
Yet if the origins of the Mirpuris migratory initiative long antedated the construction of Mangla Dam, 
the effects of both, which were further compounded by the area's peripheral political and administrative 
status, subsequently reacted with each other in an extremely explosive way. By the mid 1970's, Mirpur 
was in a state of economic ferment. Large numbers of men had left to work in Britain during the 
previous decade, but few had by then reunited their families overseas. Instead most were still acting as 
inter-continental commuters, making regular visits back home during which they took the opportunity to 
invest their accumulated savings – most usually by building splendid new houses for themselves and 
their families. So great was the volume of remittances during the 1970's that they gave rise to a 
spectacular, if highly localised and very temporary, economic boom. 
 
No-where was this process more marked than in Dadial Tehsil. Perhaps because it was relatively close 
to the railway station, many sirhangs had been recruited from Dadiali villages: hence the outflow of 
migrants, and the consequent inflow of remittances, had been particularly heavy in this area. But at the 
same time Dadial's physical location ensured that no-one w s more conscious than Dadiali returnees of 
the negative consequences of the Mangla project. Thus instead of taking a Tonga from Mirpur to 
Chaomukh, they were suddenly faced with a long relatively perilous trip by boat across the new lake, for 
their homes were no longer accessible by road. And for just the same reasons the costs of house 
construction were greatly inflated, since all building materials now had to be ferried expensively across 
the lake from a place which Dadialis now began to describe with ever-increasing dismissiveness as 
Pakistan.  
 
This sense of hostility, which was fired by their steadily mor  explicit perception of their exploitation by 
Pakistan, finally came to a head as a result of a disastrous accident. A boat carrying a marriage party 
from a very influential family in one of the most affluent of Dadiali villages sank while crossing that part 
of the river Poonch that should long since have been bridged. More than fifty people were drowned. 
This proved to be the last straw. An uprising swiftly followed, in which the thana was taken over, the 
SDM was taken into custody, and, so I was told, Indian flags were ironically raised over public 
buildings. The Dadialis had had enough.  
  
The rebellion did not last long, of course, for within days the Pakistani state had re-asserted its authority. 
But the fact that this could only be done by means of a parachute drop – f r the area was as inaccessible 
to military as to civilian vehicles – embarrassingly underlined the rebels' basic argument. The point was 
taken very swiftly. Within weeks the Army had installed a temporary bridge across the river Poonch, 
and a more permanent one was completed within the year. At long last Dadial was on the map again.  
Nevertheless the damage done to public confidence was permanent. To be sure the most pressing 
grievance had been settled, but many others still rankled. So, for example, many Mirpuris were deeply 
resentful that despite their considerable contribution to Pakistan's economy through their foreign 
exchange remittances, no serious effort had been made to stimulate economic and infrastructural 
development, eith r in Dadial Tehsil, Mirpur District, or indeed in Azad Kashmir as a whole. And 
although large sums had indeed been spent on the Mangla project, its beneficiaries were most definitely 
not Mirpuri. As my informants never failed to emphasise, the benefits of Mangla's electricity were felt in 
Lahore, and even in Karachi, long before powerlines began to be installed in rural Mirpur. Without such 
connections, how could they power up fans, let alone the expensive electrical and electronic equipment 
that so many people had brought back from overseas for their smart new houses?  
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Kashmiri Nationalism? 
 
So it is that even though the boundary between Azad Kashmir and Pakistan is, in this region, largely 
artificial in cultural terms – for there are few, if any, linguistic or cultural differences between those who 
love on either side of the river Jhelum – Mirpuris now feel themselves to be very different from other 
Potohari Punjabis. They regularly assert that they are Kashmiris, and by that token ot Pakist ni. They 
also have the capacity to assert that distinctiveness in places that count: bumper stickers displaying 
Chinar leaves and the slogan I©K shmir are now commonplace on the streets of Birmingham, Bradford 
and London. This matters: as the British have learned in Ulster, and India with Punjab, the existence of 
an overseas diaspora means that those back home can always rely on the support of their cousins 
overseas, and that whenever the going gets tough back home, those developments will swiftly be drawn 
to the attention of the international media.  
 
Nor is it hard to see why this sense of Kashmiri nationalism should have emerged so swiftly and so 
vigorously in Mirpur. Given their very reasonable view that Pakistan has not only overlooked their 
interests, but has unashamedly exploited both their environmental resources and their hard-earned 
financial assets, their self-definition as Kashmiris, and not as Pakistanis, provides Mirpuris with a 
powerful means of both expressing and legitimising their grievances.  
 
Hence there is there is a great deal of enthusiastic support both within the District itself – and even more 
so amongst the overseas Mirpuri diaspora – for the prospect of a Kashmir which is truly Azad. 
"Kashmir Zindabad! Pakistan Murdabad!" they cry with great enthusiasm.  
 
Local Contradictions 
 
Yet however genuine these feelings of Kashmiri nationalism may be, they must also be put in context. In 
the first place they are reinforced by some yet more parochial considerations, not least because the 
present administration in distant Muzaffarabad – which can be reached much more quickly by way of 
Islamabad and Murree than along the long winding road through the hills – is no  only controlled by 
non-Mirpuris, but by people who ultimately favour Kashmir's incorporationt  Pakista . So it was that 
when Sardar Qayyum, an integrationist  Poonchi Sudhan who was subsequently to become Chief 
Minister of Azad Kashmir, sought to speak at an election rally in Dadial in 1985, he faced hostile 
demonstrations. Only when protected by a substantial military presence could be escorted safely out of 
town. Such tensions remain to this day.  
 
A Wholly Independent Kashmir?  
 
What are we to make of all this? On the face of it the presence of strongly articulated anti-Pakistani 
feelings in Mirpur might seem to give succour to those who argue that a wholly independent state of 
Kashmir which incorporated the overwhelmingly Muslim areas to the West of the Pir Panjal as well as 
the Srinagar valley itself would form a viable entity. But of this I am extremely doubtful. 
 
First, the strong anti-Pakistani sentiments which are so salient in Mirpur need to be seen as a product of 
local specificities: they are by no means necessarily shared in other parts of Azad Kashmir. Second, 
although there is certainly widespread support for greater regional autonomy amongst Azad Kashmiris, 
just as there is in every other region of Pakistan (and India!), there is no evidence – especially in th light 
of District-based diversities in interest and bir deriaffiliation – that support for a wholly independent 
Kashmir either is, or even that it might become, either coherent or comprehensive. Thirdly if ever this 
did occur, or even if it seemed a realistic possibility, the very substantial cultural differences between the 
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Kashmiris of the valley, and the essentially Potohari population to the west of the Pir Panjal would 
undoubtedly loom increasingly large: given the strength of negative memories of valley-cent d
Kashmiri rule, the prospects of serious contradictions opening up between the two populations are very 
strong indeed.  
 
However as a look at the map swiftly reveals, the most substantial obstacle to a comprehensive 
reunification of a wholly independent Kashmir is essentially geographical. Since a major portion of 
Pakistan's current Hydel capacity, and the principal reservoir for the entire canal system in West Punjab 
would be contained within the boundaries of such a State, it would hold a whip hand over Pakistan's 
entire economy. While bargaining over such issues between two relatively autonomous units within a 
single federal system would inevitably be fierce, such a process can at least be envisaged: the same 
cannot be said of a confrontation over the same issues between two wholly independent states. It is for 
this reason that there is no prospect whatsoever of Pakistan being prepared to allow all of Punjab's 
immediate submontane tracts to fall under the control of an independent state, whatever the opinions of 
the local population may be, and however much they may hanker for the creation of a truly Azad 
Kashmir.  
 
Pluralism, Repression and Nationalism 
 
Are, then, geo-p litical realities – whether with respect to Mangla, or the entire Srinagar Valley – the 
only issues that matter? The dominant majorities on both sides do indeed seem to assume the right to tell 
minorities to put up and shut up should the more specific and more localised interests and concerns of 
those minorities prove to stand in contradiction to their own. What though, are the consequences of 
such stances? 
 
What my own experience – which has involved an exploration of the tensions thrown up by the arrival 
of South Asian settlers in Britain, as well as those surrounding their departure from their rural homes in 
East Punjab as well as in Mirpur – has led me to conclude is that although locally dominant groups do 
indeed only too regularly seek to impose their own hegemony over smaller and subordinated minorities, 
they do so at their peril. 
 
Hegemonic majorities – be they the English in Britain, Hindus in India, or Punjabis in Pakistan – find it 
all too easy to convince themselves that their demands for minority compliance, which they usually 
justify as a necessary means of sustaining the integrity of the national order, are simply a matter of 
common sense. By the same token they feel it is quite in order for them to overlook and ignore any cries 
of protest which emerge from the minorities, usually on the grounds that they are unnecessary, 
unrepresentative and inappropriate. 
 
When they find themselves caught up in such situations, minority demands are usually – at least in the 
initial stages – relatively limited in scope. In the first instance all that is usually sought is a rather more 
positive recognition of the legitimacy of their distinctive interests and concern , d their main goal is 
usually no more than to gain a position of greater autonomy and dignity within the wider social order.  
 
If, however, these requests for a more positive recognition of their distinctiveness are denied, and if, 
worse still their proposals come to be perceived as an ungrateful and possibly traitorous attempt to 
undermine the established political, social and cultural order, minorities rarely buckle and submit, no 
matter how vigorously the majority seek to impose their hegemony. On th  c ntrary the outcome of 
such efforts – whether the battles are being fought in Bradford, Birmingham, Kashmir, Punjab, or indeed 
Ayodya – is invariably the very opposite of what was originally intended. In such circumstances 
minorities invariably ecome even more determined both to sustain their distinctiveness and to maximise 
  
 
their autonomy and/or independence.  
 
In the midst of such polarisation, majorities which persist in dismissing all forms of minority 
assertiveness as subversive, anti-national and terroristic will only worsen the situation. To be sure  those 
who advance these self-serving arguments may well succeed in convincing themselves of the 
righteousness of their own position; but the more they do so, the more they will reinforce the minorities' 
conclusion that the only way forward is to redouble their efforts to struggle for greater autonomy.  
 
How, then are such contradictions to be resolved? Geographical partition is one option: but as India 
knows to its cost – and as Britain has nowdiscovered in Ulster – the moth-eaten outcomes of partition 
may still prove to be just as seriously internally divided as was the whole unit in the first place. Yet if 
partition is not the answer, what other alternatives are available? Of course there is one solution which is 
available right at the other end of the scale: genocide. But though this is, sadly enough, a kind of 
solution which is far from unknown in human history, it is hardly one to be recommended.  
 
Is there a middle path? Despite the viciousness f so many contemporary ethnic conflicts, there can be 
little doubt that these contradictions can be bridged. But the lessons are everywhere the same. Until the 
dominant majority – whomsoever it happens to consist of4 – i  prepared to act with a greater d gree of 
magnanimity, to be more respectful of minority distinctiveness, and to give them much greater scope for 
the expression of their social, cultural and political autonomy no progress whatsoever will be made. 
Pluralism is, in other words, the only way forward. 
 
But it is still remarkably difficult to achieve, and for fairly obvious reasons. To unwind these logjams, it 
is always the majority which has to take the first step, most importantly by acknowledging to itself that it 
has indeed been acting in a hegemonic way. And to do that they must first strip away the ideological 
framework which they will invariably have generated in order to obscure their hegemonic tendencies 
from themselves – whether that be the vision of their civilising mission with which European Imperialists 
sought to cloak their racism, or the equally chauvinistic notions of "secularism" by means of which most 
North Indian Hindus currently justify central policies in Kashmir, Punjab – and perh ps even Ayodya. 
 
If any given process of ethnic and communal polarisation is ever to resolved – whether it occurs in 
Kashmir, Karachi, Punjab, U.P. or inner-c ty B itain – it is always the dominant majority to take the first 
and most substantial step towards the negotiation of a mutually satisfactory compromise. Most are, 
however, extremely reluctant to make such a move, preferring instead to adopt a position of embattled 
righteousness, little realising that the longer they delay negotiations, the larger that crucial first step will 
always prove to be. Well entrenched majorities do indeed frequently conclude that such pluralistic 
approach is completely beyond the pale, on the grounds that this would be to undermine all they hold 
most dear, whether they define that as England's sceptred isle, or Aryavarta. But all those who advocate 
such a stance would do well to remember that the adoption of such an intransigent stance often 
precipitate truly horrific outcomes, where everything they hold most dear is pulled down around their 
ears. But horrors are not the fault of the minorities: those who precipitate them have only themselves to 
blame. 
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES 
  
1. While my own research has focused primarily on Punjabi settlers in Britain, the vast majority of whom 
originate either from Mirpur or f om the Jullundur Doab in East Punjab, I have been involved in two 
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periods of intensive field research in Mirpur District itself, the first for six weeks in 1981, and the second 
for six months in 1985. It is largely on the basis of that experience that this arti l  s been written. 
2. An excellent account of this uprising, and of the conflict which followed until the cease-fire in 1948 in 
A. H. Suharawardy Tragedy in Kashmir Lahore: Wajidalis 1983. 
3. I have set out a more detailed analysis of the history of overseas migration from Mirpur, and of its 
impact on the local social and economic order in Chapters entitled "The Political Economy of 
Migration: Pakistan, Britain, and the Middle East" in J.S. Eades (ed.) Migrants, Workers and the Social 
Order London: Tavistock 1987, and "?????" in Alavi, H and Hariss, J (eds.) The Sociology of 
Development: South Asia London: Macmillan 1989. 
4. It should always be remembered that groups who find themselves treated as an excluded minority in 
one context may well also ct, in other contexts, as equally oppressive excluders of others further down 
the pile than themselves. Jews may, for example, have found themselves subjected to the most vicious 
forms of anti-Semitism in Europe, but this has not prevented them from acing in an equally oppressive 
manner towards the Palestinians. Numerous examples of the same phenomenon can be found in India. 
